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ABSTRACT
Calculating patent damages can be a costly and difficult process for litigants.
Because of the requirement that damages not fall below a reasonable royalty, there
has been substantial focus on how to determine what a reasonable royalty is. This
article examines the history of the doctrine and the policies underlying its existence.
Due to conflicting strains of the doctrine which serve distinct but separate policy
goals, the article proposes that federal judges separate the two strains into distinct
and independent bases for recovery. By doing this the courts will be able to expand
and refine the two fundamentally different theories without needing to reconcile
contradictory public-policy purposes.
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DAMAGES CONTROL: RETURNING ROYALTIES TO THEIR REASONABLE
ROOTS
ADAM FRIEDMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A patent-holder files suit, finishes discovery, and manages to win on the issues
of infringement as well as damages. Happy as can be, the attorneys begin to uncork
the champagne and celebrate, only to find their client cannot collect anything yet
because they didn’t prove damages ‘well enough.’ The firm followed the law, bringing
in evidence to meet the long list of factors set out in Georgia-Pacific,1 hired experts,2
found licenses,3 did everything they were all-but told was needed by the Supreme
Court in order to obtain their judgment—yet the court came back vacating the
damage award because it was too ‘speculative.’ 4 The attorneys stand scratching their
heads trying to figure out what happened while they scramble to prepare for a new
trial on the matter of damages.
Just like any tort, recovery for patent infringement not only requires the
plaintiff prove the elements of the claim—a valid patent, and that the accused
product infringes—but also requires an evidentiary showing of how much the
patent-holder should be awarded.
For patent infringement, all remedies are defined in the statute, 5 including
injunction6 and damages awards.7 The awards available under the statute are
generally divided conceptually into two camps: lost profits and reasonable royalty.8
* © Adam Friedman 2016. Adam Friedman 2016. Juris Doctor Candidate, The John Marshall
Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Business Administration, Robert Morris University, 2015. I would
like to thank my friends and family particularly my parents Corey and Leslie Friedman and my
grandfather Robert Schey; without their support and love I would never have come to law school let
alone receive the opportunity to write for this journal. I would further like to thank the 2015-16
board for The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law as well as Professor Maureen
Collins for supporting me during the process. I would also like to thank Professor Daryl Lim for his
class on patents and RIPL alumnus Adam Kelly for inspiring this article with his guest lecture.
Finally, I would like to thank Hoover Institution Fellow Richard A. Epstein. We have never met,
however your podcasts, interviews, and books on policy and law were largely what inspired me to sit
for the LSAT and arrive where I am today.
1 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The
court lays out fifteen factors to consider, drawn from leading cases at the time (see full list infra note
22).
2 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
The last clause specifically calls for expert testimony to help in
determining damages.
3 Georgia-Pacific Corp, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (factors one and two both specifically reference
licenses).
4 See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
5 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-285, 289.
6 35 U.S.C. § 283.
7 35 U.S.C. § 284.
8 But cf. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324 (the court appears to state that lost profits and reasonable
royalty analyses are actually separate and distinct from “damages”, calling them “alternative
categories of infringement compensation” (emphasis added) after commenting on damages,
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Between the two, lost profits might be considered the “pot of gold” for patent awards
because, so long as you can provide sufficient evidence, the primary limit on
collectible damages is one of mere causation. 9 While the causal burdens may be high,
the reach of conceivable compensation is broad once the hurdle is overcome. 10 The
reasonable royalty, as originally envisioned, might be better called a “consolation
prize” and was originally created by the courts to allow for some compensation when
a plaintiff won his or her infringement action, but could not meet the evidentiary
burdens on the award. 11 Despite the policy underlying reasonable royalty, courts in
recent cases such as Lucent have demonstrated that reasonable royalty awards are
anything but automatic, even with a jury award in the patentee’s favor.12 Even
worse, Georgia-Pacific, the leading case in reasonable royalty calculations, gives a
list of factors that are inclined to fall under Lucent’s scrutiny as speculative.13 With
this in mind, patent-holders and policy-makers will be right to ask, “How do we
resolve this tension?”
To explore this question, Part II will lay out the existing law, cases, policies, and
standards which are used in addition to some economic considerations that might
inform a solution. Part III will analyze the law and policy laid out in Part II and
identify key strengths and pitfalls of the system. Additionally, Part III will point out
alternative interpretations of the existing law which might not be currently favored.
generally, the previous sentence. This may just be a negligible misstatement, otherwise the Lucent
court appears to view damages as a distinct category whose analysis differs from lost profits or
reasonable royalty theories).
9 See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (measure
of compensation is the actual loss).
10 See Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“the
assessment of adequate damages under section 284 does not limit the patent holder to the amount of
diverted sales of a commercial embodiment of the patented product.”). As a practical matter, for lost
profits the patent-holder can recover just about any economic loss, or even lost economic opportunity
which is a causal result of the infringement (assuming they can prove it). So long as there is a
pecuniary harm of some form, the patentee shows causation to the infringement, and evidentiary
hurdles are overcome, there are no real ‘limits’ to what can be recovered through lost profits.
11 See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 547, 600 (D. Del.
1997) (citing Hayhurst v. Rosen, 1992 WL 123178, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[R]easonable
royalty . . . is a measure of recovery intended to provide a just recovery to persons who for
evidentiary or other reasons cannot prove lost profits or an established royalty.”); see also 7 DONALD
S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03[3] (2015). Despite the repetition of this principle in many
cases, modern reasonable royalty analysis more closely resembles traditional damages in terms of
proof than it does some sort of truly lower burden for the instances where evidence is wanting. In
many regards, the courts treat reasonable royalties as if they were merely an alternative type of
profit which might be lost and must be proven.
12 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324 (“lost profits are not at issue in the present case”). Despite the
determination that the award was for reasonable royalty rather than lost profits, the Lucent court
ruled that the award was not supported by substantial evidence and was therefore impermissible.
Id. at 1338.
13 See Am. Med. Sys. v. Medical Eng'g Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1370, 1394 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (the
process is truly artificial); Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Gennum Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10604, *1
n.4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2004) (the process is an “inaccurate, even fanciful, construct”); Smith Eng'g
Co. v. Eisenmann Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21803, *14 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2000) (“necessarily
relies upon more than a bit of fantastical abstraction”). Despite the seeming agreement of the courts
that there is little grounding in reality for the Georgia-Pacific hypothetical negotiation, it is still
somehow deemed not to be speculative for the court to rely on a fanciful arbitrary construct in
framing how to determine damages.
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Part IV will explore the field of possible resolutions and decide upon a solution.
Finally, Part V will conclude, summarizing the strengths of the proposed solution,
and why it is preferable to the alternatives.
II. BACKGROUND
In terms of potential awards for recovery, lost profits theoretically outstrip
reasonable royalties. Since the turn of the century, reasonable royalties have
constituted in the range of eighty percent of all damages awards in patent
litigation.14 Though from 2010 to 2014 the balance has shifted back toward lost
profits, it is nonetheless crucial to understand from whence reasonable royalty stems
and where it might or ought to go.15 First, we will look at the statute governing
patent damages. Next, we will turn to the most relevant cases dealing with
reasonable royalty damages today. Georgia-Pacific lays out the factors at the core of
reasonable royalty litigation, while Lucent, ResQNet, and WordTech Sys. combine to
form a line of cases detailing the quality and fitness required in litigation. Finally,
we will turn to economic considerations by looking at the problem of royalty-stacking.
A. Differentiating Damages: The Policy Origins of Lost Profits and Reasonable
Royalties.
Patent damages, like all other aspects of modern patent-law, are rooted in the
constitution and statutes.16 The first step when examining damages should be the
plain text of 35 U.S.C. § 284, which starts:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention
by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the
court . . . the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed.17
The modern statute codifies the reasonable royalty approach developed by the
courts during the early twentieth century.18 Lost profits and the related rules and
CHRIS BARRY ET AL., 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2014).
Id. Lost profits from 2010 to 2014 are up to thirty-seven percent of cases. Noticing that
Lucent was penned in 2009, and two more instances of the speculation standard being used to
overturn awards within a year of the decision, it seems reasonable to suspect that the shift back
towards lost profits is due to the arguably increased (or at least clarified) burdens for sufficiently
proving reasonable royalty. If the patentee will have to prove-up substantial evidence to support
their damages, they might as well go for lost profits which allow a wider range of compensable
issues.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390.
17 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
18 U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1914) (sets forth the right to recover
in absence of evidence of lost profits or established royalty on a concept of “general damages” or
“reasonable royalty”).
14
15
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doctrines, on the other hand, come as a matter of necessity, and the traditional rule
that compensation should restore the injured to the condition they would have been
in if the infringement had never occurred.19 The reasonable royalty, understood as a
separate category to consider independently of lost profits, was created by the courts
in order to allow sufficient recovery for those patent-holders who could not satisfy the
evidentiary burdens needed to show lost profits or established royalty. 20 Before this
development in the courts (and its later codification in the 1952 code), reasonable
royalty was merely another avenue to show pecuniary harm which warranted
compensation.21

19 See Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886).
The “pecuniary condition”
analysis here is reminiscent of common-law breach of contract, as the objective is more or less to
make the party whole. Given that the patent-instrument could be theoretically construed as a
contract between the inventor and the public (through the government), this intuitively makes sense
as the basis of recovery.
20 1-20 CHISUM, supra note 11, § 20.03.
21 Hubbell's Case, 5 Ct. Cl. 1 (Ct. Cl. 1869).
Among the first cases to mention reasonable
royalties in U.S. patent law is Hubbell’s Case. This case was brought before the court as a result of
a legislative resolution to determine whether Hubbell invented a shell and/or fuse used by the
United States government and, if so, how much he should be paid for previous use and how much to
award him in exchange for a total transfer of rights to the government. “Reasonable royalty”
appears in the case at all due to claimant raising expert testimony on the matter, suggesting it as
evidence of the value he should be awarded in the suit for past use. However, Joint Resolution 3d
June, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 588.) granting the court authority to oversee the matter limited
compensation to one hundred thousand dollars. The amount purported by the experts as the
amount due under a reasonable royalty theory would have been near two hundred thousand dollars.
The court disregarded this number and focused on the lesser mandated maximum reward in the
resolution. The resolution, which allowed the case to come before the court, merely stated that the
court would award an “amount of compensation [Hubbell] is entitled to receive for the use of the
inventions up to the time of adjudication, and for a full and entire transfer of his patents to the
United States.” Hubbell, 5 Ct. Cl. at 1. It did not prescribe any particular method or theory which
would be used to determine the amount. In this way, Hubbell’s attorneys brought up reasonable
royalty as essentially a form of profits to which Hubbell was entitled from the government’s use.
The court in this case stated, “[t]he actual loss sustained by the patentee is to be measured by the
actual profits or benefits received by the infringer.” Id. at 31. The court was initially receptive to
the idea that the reasonable royalty would be a proper measure for determining the “actual loss” to
be compensated. Congress’s resolution regarding the cap on damages, however, tied its hands. This
rendered the reasonable royalty analysis essentially moot. Still, it is interesting to note that, at this
point in time, the patentee was effectively arguing that the ‘reasonable royalty’ not paid was
effectively a pecuniary harm reminiscent of lost profits—the patent-holder was denied the ability to
obtain those royalties through license, there was no question of the causal link (once it was shown
that he was the inventor), and his argument was proffering evidence to support why he was entitled
to those specific damages.
At the time of Hubbell’s Case, the statute in force stated damages be “any sum above the
amount found by such verdict as the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three
times the amount thereof, according to the circumstances of the case, with costs.” Patent Act of
1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (July 4, 1836). The “up to three times greater” dynamic still persists.
Courts have clarified that, in the modern statute, it is only to be used for willful infringement. See
35 U.S.C. § 284.
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B. Georgia-Pacific: The Fifteen Factor Framework.
While 35 U.S.C. § 284 composes the modern backbone for reasonable royalty
recovery, case law has been the vehicle to flesh out the particulars. Fights over
evidence embody the focus in reasonable royalty litigation. In what might be called
the ‘early years,’ courts determined many individual pieces of evidence which were
particularly helpful in assisting the determination of reasonable royalty amounts.
These myriad rulings were compiled and pruned to a list of fifteen factors commonly
called the Georgia-Pacific factors, or Georgia-Pacific test.22 These factors amount to
facts and circumstances of the market-place which tend to determine the range of

22

Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the
patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business;
or whether they are inventor and promotor.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products
of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator
of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed
sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices,
if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to
those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the
amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the
patented invention—would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able
to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.

[15:827 2016]

Damages Control:
Returning Royalties to Their Reasonable Roots

833

feasible agreements for each party, or which tend to point towards specific values
within the feasible range.23
C. The Substantial Evidence Standard
In addition to what kinds of evidence are necessary or useful for finding a
reasonable royalty, recent decisions have focused on the extent of that evidence’s
usefulness. Starting with the Federal Circuit’s reversal of a jury award in Lucent,
cases began getting overturned for lack of substantial evidence justifying the jury’s
damage award at a regular clip for the better part of a year. In short order the
Federal Circuit spawned a trilogy which shook loose previous conceptions on what
constituted adequate proof for reasonable royalty damages.
1. Lucent Technology
In Lucent, the patentee brought into evidence licenses, examples of other
lump-sum royalties in the industry, and expert testimony. 24 Based on these and
other pieces of evidence—including the total market value of the infringing product—
the jury returned its verdict to the tune of $367 million.25 The trial court decided the
evidence proffered was substantial enough to support the award.26 On appeal,
however, the Federal Circuit disagreed holding that the evidence was speculative in
nature, and that speculation cannot substantiate a damage claim. 27

23 See 1-20 CHISUM, supra note 11, § 20.07. Chisum divides the factors into two groups, one of
which is to determine the possible range of agreements the two parties might come to, and the other
would specify or refine the inquiry to more discrete numbers (or at least tend to either increase or
decrease the value based on how the factor went). Realistically, the entire list is composed of
common-sense outposts of economic information that are informative of the environment and the
product itself, both of which are causally related to what price a patentee would be willing to license
at, and what price a purchaser would be willing to acquire a license. Taking factor 5 as an example;
all else being equal, a licensor will tend to charge more for a license to a direct competitor than some
other party. The corollary to this would be that if the licensee is a direct competitor, the reasonable
royalty should be greater than if they were not, as this is a proper reflection of the underlying
economic reality.
24 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
25 Id. at 1028.
The jury awarded $357,693,056.18 on the ‘356 patent, and a combined
$10,401,000 between the two infringers on the ‘295 patent.
26 Id. at 1043. The trial court stated in no uncertain terms “[t]he jury's verdict is supported by
substantial evidence” with regard to the ‘356 patent’s award. Further, the district court found
“substantial evidence supports the jury's award” for the ‘295 patent. Id. at 1058.
27 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) quoting Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121
(1884) (“Evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative”). In spite of the
seeming consensus that the Georgia-Pacific hypothetical negotiation is a fantastical construct, see
supra note 13, the Lucent court had no apparent problem with utilizing the hypothetical negotiation.
As the court spent no time addressing the myriad conjectures inherent in the entire proposition of
determining what two parties who didn’t negotiate would have agreed to be the bargain price each
side would accept at the time of the infringement, when neither is apparently allowed to disagree
and leave as would be typical in a real negotiation.
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2. ResQNet
Not half a year after Lucent came ResQNet.28 Despite dealing with a slightly
different set of factual issues regarding damages,29 the court ultimately turned its
decision on the attenuated nature of the proffered licenses which were used for
comparison under the first Georgia-Pacific factor.30 Similarly to Lucent, despite
eviscerating several of the proffered licenses in their analysis and concluding that
they were too unreliable a measure to justify an increased royalty, the ResQNet court
did not reverse the admission of the evidence it found insubstantial.31
3. Wordtech Systems
Completing a hat-trick of cases decided on very similar grounds on appeal,
Wordtech32 finds the Federal Circuit once again reversing and remanding a case
where the plaintiff’s primary evidence was licenses the court deemed incomparable,
leaving the award unsupported by sufficient evidence. 33 In looking at the lump-sum
licenses upon which the verdict was based, the court seemed to imply that, without
additional evidence to show how and why the previous lump-sum licenses compare to
the license at issue, it would look skeptically on any award that results—even one as
relatively ‘modest’ for a patent suit as this case. 34

ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 868. At issue was a running royalty, rather than a lump sum. The award itself was not
necessarily at issue. Instead, it was the percentage rate and methodology which were in question.
30 Id. at 870. The court went as far as to say that the other factors had no weight in this case,
and that Dr. David’s calculation, based on noticeably different licenses rather than the “straight
licenses” which were in evidence, rendered his testimony unreliable. Though, it is not clear whether
the court believed the other factors had no weight because the other evidence available in this
specific instance was weak, or whether it was the nature of the product and the fact that the
patentee had actually licensed it in the past.
31 See id. at 872. The Federal Circuit seems to wag its finger at the lower court by quoting
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991), all but saying
“just because only one side had expert testimony doesn’t mean you should have relied on it.” Id. at
1168. The court later emphasized the point by calling it error to have increased the royalty based on
the licenses which bore little relation. But no statement was made about whether such attenuated
licenses should even have been allowed in the first place if they were so irrelevant as to be error for
giving them the weight one would expect of them (to increase the royalty rate).
32 Wordtech Sys. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
33 Id. at 1320 (citing Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1330). Unlike ResQNet, the court once again examined
the differences between running and lump-sum royalties, and why evidence of one did not
necessarily provide insights as to the other.
Based on cases such as Lucent and Wordtech, it would be unsurprising if the Federal Circuit
might someday adopt a per se rule that, without defining the relationship between the licenses
brought in as evidence and the case at issue, any award based on lump-sum licenses is necessarily
invalid as speculative.
34 See Barry et al., supra note 14. Despite trending downward in recent years, the median
patent damages award is still above four million dollars.
28
29

[15:827 2016]

Damages Control:
Returning Royalties to Their Reasonable Roots

835

D. Royalty Stacking.
The underlying policy consideration in the Lucent line of cases is one of
preventing overcompensation of patentees. Royalty-stacking adds an important look
into the problems which are potentially caused if overcompensation runs rampant. 35
Even small overcompensation to component patents can quickly lead to an infringing
product needing to pay out more in royalties for all of its components combined than
the actual total value of the product itself. 36 The recent focus of patent damage
litigation over reasonable royalties rather than lost profits accentuates these
concerns.37 The Federal Circuit has turned its eye to the issue, saying that
considerations of royalty stacking are appropriate in hypothetical negotiation
analysis for reasonable royalty calculation. 38 All together we can see there are two
main schools of thought which have shaped what constitutes a “reasonable royalty.”
The first line of thought is articulated by Judge Denison. The Denison framework
acts as remedial recovery when infringement has been proven, but damages have not
or cannot be. The alternative looks at the reasonable royalty in much the same
manner as lost profits, and requires litigants to prove both infringement and the
extent of their damages. In the latter formulation, cases like Lucent are instructive
for the limits of what evidence is sufficient to prove the damages asserted.
III. ANALYSIS
To understand what a reasonable royalty is, case law’s lists of factors or
considerations are insufficient. The starting point truly goes back to the damage
theories themselves, and how they seek to serve the competing policy goals embodied
in § 284.39 To do this, we must look at the landscape in which these theories sit

35 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991,
1993 (2007). Royalty stacking is where a product incorporates many technologies, and attempting to
get free of patent litigation through royalties, requires a large number of licenses to be “stacked”
together to determine the total burden imposed.
36 Id. This is easily and intuitively illustrated by simply taking a basic hypothetical case to a
relative extreme. A product with one hundred and one patented components. If each component
manages a royalty of “just” one percent each, the total royalty burden on each product sold will be
greater than one hundred percent of the price of the product. It is thus easy to imagine how even a
small overcompensation over a large number of patented components could easily eat up more than
the entire profits of the infringer.
37 See id. at 2012-2013.
38See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 871-72 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev'd on
other grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
39 Compare Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 35, at 1993 (which explores the problems of
overcompensation) with Procter & Gamble, 989 F. Supp. at 600 (acknowledging the purpose of the
reasonable royalty theory as to ensure compensation to patent holders (citing 7 Donald S. Chisum,
Chisum on Patents § 20.03[3] at 20-159)). In broad terms, even the simplest scheme for damages
must at the very least consider two factors to balance and weigh. Insufficient compensation
systemically means that ‘wrongdoers’ can effectively appropriate value of others’ at a net-gain even
after suit. Overgenerous compensation will punish ‘wrongdoers’ beyond what their activity
warrants, this will cause potential ‘wrongdoers’ to refrain from such activity even when doing so
would be a net-gain after proper compensation is given. In the former case you have inefficient

[15:827 2016] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

836

relative to one another. Overall, it appears that there are two great currents driving
the law of reasonable royalty: under-compensation and overcompensation. First we
will look at compensation generally, to have a baseline. Next we will look at how
concerns of under-compensation ultimately created the reasonable royalty framework
as explained by Judge Denison.40 Next we will look at how overcompensation
concerns (typical of lost profits analysis) shape the modern framework. Finally we
will look at the history, both statutory and case law, to determine where the fault
lines are which result in the confusion present today.
A. Compensation; The standard.
Looking at the statute,41 it is important to note that the primary principle for
recovery is merely “compensation.” While this is typically divided into either lost
profits recovery or reasonable royalty recovery,42 it is worth noting that so long as the
recovery is compensatory in nature the statute seems to suggest it ought to be
recoverable even if it isn’t strictly a “royalty” or “profit” which is being
compensated.43
It is likely better to describe the different theories of recovery not by the form
they take, or even the policy objectives behind them, but rather the evidentiary
burdens the theories require.44 In this manner of examination, lost profits is the
most intuitive of the standards and thus should be examined first.

activity being promoted by allowing the offset of some costs or potential costs, in the latter you have
efficient activity being punished by introducing additional costs.
40 U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 616-618 (6th Cir. 1914).
41 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
42 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (1. The royalties received by the
patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty).
Though an “established royalty” is technically its own category of recovery, the requirements to
prove it render it disfavored. Further, through reference in the first Georgia-Pacific factor, the
established royalty question can be seen as more or less incorporated into the Reasonable Royalty
analysis.
43 See Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 995 F. 3d 1109, 1118 (Fed Cir. 1996). In
practice, this may be a moot point—the broad recovery under lost profits is very likely sufficient to
cover any “non-profit” costs or harms which are in need of compensation due to the infringement.
44 Compare Hubbell’s Case, 5 Ct. Cl. 1 (Ct. Cl. 1869), with U.S. Frumentum, 216 F. at 617 (these
two cases exemplify the two branches of thought when looking at patent recovery, compensation for
actual loss in Hubbell, and compensation despite lack of proof of “actual” loss in U.S. Frumentum).
At their core all of the damage theories which have existed in patents all amount to different
manners of fulfilling the objective of compensating the patentee. Whether it is lost profits,
established royalty, or reasonable royalty, the basic idea in patent recovery is “these are earnings or
economic value the patentee would have obtained/retained if there had been no infringement;
therefore, they are entitled to that amount.” Where the real differences between the theories occur
is in the burdens of proof to successfully acquire the purported sums. Part and parcel to the change
in evidentiary burden is also a reduction in the breadth of recovery. Since the objective is always
compensation only those compensable ‘items’ which can be shown or presumed at the lower burden
without running into overcompensation concerns will be obtained by using such a theory.
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1. Lost Profits and Causation.
The standard for proving Lost Profits is exemplified in the Panduit “but-for”
test.45 The analysis revolves around simple causation: any economic harm which was
caused by the infringement is compensable. 46 The “but-for” test here stands as a
gatekeeper to prevent overcompensation, and to ensure that recovery is targeted at
the correct party.
Even if, in the abstract, a harm did occur and even if it were properly attributed
to the infringer, it may not be compensated unless it is also shown that the harm
would not have otherwise occurred absent the infringement. 47 Once causation is
shown, the risks of overcompensation or of the infringer being forced to compensate
injury for which some other party is the source are substantially reduced. 48
2. Established Royalty.
Compared to general economic harm, courts quickly recognized a “separate”
category of recovery with slightly different evidentiary burdens. The ‘established
royalty’ works on a very simple premise: if the business has been licensing this
product at a given price/profit, then any infringement can be presumed to have
caused injury to the amount which the infringer would have paid under the existing
royalty rates.
If the infringer had chosen not to infringe, then it is intuitive that they would
have likely licensed the technology,49 and the price at which the technology had been

Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
47 Id. In theory, since the policy is to compensate the patentee any harm that actually occurs
ought to entitle the patentee to damages. However, in practice, evidentiary burdens exist to prevent
overcompensation. The test of causation is ultimately a policy-decision on the part of the courts. At
a purely abstract level, you could divide all harms that occur into two camps—harms which are
demonstrably caused by the infringement, and those which have a more tenuous relationship.
Tenuous harms by their nature are less definite, less concrete, and therefore more likely to result in
overcompensation. Any harm which can be demonstrated to be caused by the infringement by
definition will not be overcompensation (as the demonstration of the causation proves the
entitlement to at least that amount). Intuitively, it makes sense to ask of a plaintiff claiming that a
harm is demonstrably caused by the infringement to “prove up” this claim by actually
demonstrating the causal link. Thus the but-for causation test both sets the line drawn on what can
be recovered, and offers a mechanism to ensure the line isn’t crossed.
48 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 35, at 1993 (examining the net effects of even small
overcompensation in the patent context). It is still possible that the value of the harm claimed could
be improperly valued at too high a rate. But this is a risk that likely cannot be eliminated. The
causation test may not be perfect at preventing overcompensation, but it does reduce the risk of
compensating injury that did not even occur, or injury for which the defendant is not the proper
target and for which the plaintiff must seek recovery elsewhere or not at all.
49 See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120-1121. In the context of established royalty, the
previous licensing of the technology evidences that companies wishing to use the patented
technology would seek and acquire a license. In this sense the established royalty acts to show both
how much the patentee would receive and how much a licensor would tend to be willing to pay. It
also shows that licensing the technology is a likely method by which market-participants would
acquire access to the technology, suggesting that revenues of this kind were surely lost. In other
45
46
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licensed previously is indicative of what market-actors are willing to pay for the
license.50 The questions of causation mostly fall away in this framework, and instead
the inquiry is whether a royalty has actually been established, or whether some other
consideration should increase or decrease the established rate. 51
B. Under-compensation, birth of the Denison Reasonable Royalty.
In the early twentieth century, however, some courts noted the difficulty a
patentee can have in meeting the evidentiary burdens of the causation test. 52 Courts
began recognizing the idea that just because a patentee was unable to show causal
harm did not mean they should go utterly uncompensated. It was at this point that a
“general damages” theory, with a lower—arguably nonexistent—evidentiary
threshold came into use.53 Eventually this form of recovery was coined as
“reasonable royalty,” even though some (like Judge Denison) readily acknowledged it
as something of a misnomer.54 In some sense, this form of analysis might be viewed
as a kind of ‘heightened’ nominal damages. 55

words, if other market-participants were willing to license, then surely this firm would have also
licensed if forced to participate in the proper marketplace rather than infringe.
50 Id. On some level, this is tautological or reflexive in nature. “If market actors are willing to
pay X, then the price a market actor would be willing to pay is also X.”
51 See Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 165 (1889). The elements of the test in this case all go
towards establishing whether the pre-existing royalty ought to be used as a basis for recovery.
52 See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. The first few factors address existing royalties, but
the remaining majority of factors address other questions relating to the status of the market in
question and the relationship of the parties. Of course some technologies are not as easily
susceptible to licenses, or business circumstances might make the selling of licenses impractical, or
even foolish—such as the case when the only reasonable licensor would be a direct competitor.
53 See U.S. Frumentum, 216 F. at 617. Taken to its logical extreme, if the purpose is to allow
recovery when a plaintiff cannot meet the evidentiary burdens of lost profits, then it might even
stretch to a plaintiff who brings or has no evidence at all in regard to damages, but has successfully
proven infringement.
54 Id. Judge Denison noting:
This damage or compensation is not, in precise terminology, a royalty at all, but it
is frequently spoken of as a “reasonable royalty”; and this phrase is a convenient
means of naming this particular kind of damage. It may also be well called
“general damage”; that is to say, damage not resting on any of the applicable,
exact methods of computation but upon facts and circumstances which permit the
jury or the court to estimate in a general, but in a sufficiently accurate, way the
injury to plaintiff caused by each infringing sale.
The entire thrust of this non-royalty is better viewed as an exercise of the court opting to use its
equitable powers to ensure a sufficient recovery to further the patent-objective of innovation.
55 Cf. Id. at 616-618. Nominal damages are traditionally token amounts, the understanding of
the nature and value of patent-rights means courts are willing to go further than just a token
gesture, even if in some non-patent contexts a similar insufficiency of evidence would not warrant
such action.
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C. Overcompensation and the “Lost Profit” Royalty.
In addition to the common-law created term of art “reasonable royalty” employed
by Judge Denison, the phrase has also been used to refer to instances where the
patentee is, at heart, claiming a form of lost profits. These claims essentially state
that they would have profited to the amount of a royalty, and while there isn’t an
“established” royalty to use, they ought to still be entitled to a “reasonable” royalty.56
Unlike the Denison reasonable royalty, this “reasonable royalty” framework is
talking about actual potential royalties in the context of income which was not
realized due to infringement (which would be the same basic framework as lost
profits).
1. Resolving the ambiguity.
In 1952 “Reasonable Royalty” was codified into the damages floor for recovery. 57
It was not, however, explicitly stated whether this was supposed to be a reference to
the Denison reasonable royalty, or the more basic “reasonable royalty” which is
merely a form of lost profits.58 Cases which have become the standard for reasonable
royalty analysis do not actually clear this up.59
56 Cf. Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1159. With the basic underlying premise being that if the amount
were reasonable, then a market-actor would have been willing to pay it. If a market-actor would
have paid it, then it is profit the patentee would have received if not for the infringement.
57 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
58 Id. While not explicitly stated in § 284, it is certainly arguable that when considered on the
whole, the structure, wording, and context heavily suggest that it is the Denison Royalty which was
intended to be codified. “When damages are not found by a jury the court shall assess them.” Id.
(emphasis added). This might be most properly read as an instruction that when a jury does not
come up with a verdict awarding damages (or when the jury does not find that the evidentiary
hurdles on damages have been overcome) the court has a duty to assess an award itself. This is
consistent with the “nominal-plus” framework the Denison Royalty intends to create. The last
clause stating “[t]he court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination of damages
or of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances” seems particularly geared towards
the idea that it may be the court itself, not the trier of fact, who may be assessing the award and
allows for the court to rely on this expert testimony, consistent with the Denison Royalty. Id.
Further, the addition of this clause would be redundant if it was intended to be used in the
alternative framework. Relevant evidence in the form of expert testimony would already be
allowable for attempting to prove damages to the trier of fact. Combined, the instructions for the
court to act and the allowance of the court to receive expert testimony heavily favor a reading of the
statute codifying the Denison Royalty (which is in fact not “a royalty at all”). See supra note 54.
59 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. Georgia-Pacific’s factors are equally useful for a trier
of fact determining an amount to award a plaintiff who failed to bring sufficient evidence supporting
a lost profits theory under a Denison Royalty by guiding them through what is more like a lost profit
framework. In the latter case, the fifteen factors are quite useful to illuminate market
considerations that would ultimately determine the price of a royalty agreement. In the former
case, they provide guideposts for the court or jury to consider when deciding what kind of award to
grant. While Denison Royalty analysis is not limited to a hypothetical negotiation framework,
determining what would have been a reasonable amount for a market-participant to pay to avoid
infringement is certainly informative. Despite the acceptance of this framework, it was not stated
which of the two above purposes in which it was intended to assist. Under the traditional rule that
a statute using a common law term retains its common law meaning when not defined in the
statute, it is reasonable to infer that in 1952 it was supposed to be a Denison Royalty. As with any
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Of the cases on the subject, it is arguably Lucent, its progeny, and the various
surrounding and related rules which might shed the most light on the matter. Read
narrowly, Lucent may be less about substantive patent damages law and more of a
reflection of the court’s distaste for patent litigants attempting to inflate the damage
award by use of the previous-license factor. Read broadly, Lucent might settle the
question of which definition of reasonable royalty to use by effectively stating that
the “lost profits” royalty framework is correct.
2. Lucent read Narrowly.
In Lucent—and the two cases following it, ResQNet and Wordtech—particular
attention is payed to the fact that the licenses presented by the plaintiffs in each of
these cases were not comparable to a license which would come out of the
hypothetical negotiation. While it is far from explicit, it is entirely possible that
these cases represent the court taking a stance against the practice of throwing
numbers and agreements around without further analysis to dissect and parse out
exactly how those licenses relate to the case in dispute, striking down awards both
large and small to hammer home the point. But if this is not merely a string of cases
used by the court to make examples out of particularly notable cases, then Lucent
has far broader implications.
3. Lucent read Broadly.
Assuming that the Lucent line of cases does not merely represent the Federal
Circuit attempting to quash what might have previously been sharp practice, it
creates some interesting results. Read broadly, it is possible to derive from Lucent
that the proper framework for reasonable royalty must be the “lost profits” royalty
approach. If reasonable royalty was to mean the Denison Royalty, then the first
objection the court should have is with it being sent to the jury at all. The Denison
Royalty is not actually a factual question of “what royalty would have been factually
reasonable,” but rather the court exercising its power to grant an award when
evidence would not warrant it. Second, if it was the Denison Royalty being
examined, the proper analysis should not have been whether there was substantial
evidence, but rather whether the award granted was an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion.60 Since the entire purpose of the Denison Royalty is to eschew the need

other common law term, however, it is the prerogative of the courts to decide in what fashion its
meaning/coverage will expand, change, or contract.
60 U.S. Frumentum, 216 F. at 617. The Denison Royalty is designed to apply when evidence is
wanting. If this is true, then it is by its very nature not a traditional factual question for the jury,
which would require substantial evidence, just like lost profits. The most extreme circumstance
where the Denison Royalty might apply is where the plaintiff chooses not to, or is incapable of
bringing any evidence to bear as to the ‘value’ they have lost. In such a circumstance, U.S.
Frumentum correctly calls for the court to simply use its discretion in evaluating the case as was
presented for infringement and decide on an amount which is proper in light of the circumstances as
they have been illuminated.
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for evidence entirely,61 it would be utterly inconsistent for the Lucent court to have
both been ruling regarding a Denison Royalty while simultaneously basing its
decision on evidentiary sufficiency.
IV. PROPOSAL
Even Lucent, read broadly, does not appear to go so far as to resolve the
ambiguity. Instead, it embodies it. There are fundamentally three approaches to
solve the ambiguity of whether the Denison Royalty, or the “lost profits” royalty
should be used by courts in a reasonable royalty analysis. We will examine each in
turn, before deciding on the option which appears to best meet the underlying policy
considerations. First, the court62 can eliminate one of the doctrines, leaving only one
to apply.63 Alternatively, the court could try to blend the two together into a single
doctrine. Finally the court could segregate and differentiate the two, allowing each
to exist as independent, but conceptually related, doctrines.
A. Elimination
The court’s first option is to simply pick from one of the two concepts of
reasonable royalty and eliminate the other.64 This approach would simplify the
doctrine by deciding conclusively whether to favor the Denison policy of ensuring that
recovery is always available for a patentee who proves infringement, or favoring the
traditional evidentiary policy of avoiding overcompensation of litigants. 65
This simplification, however, comes at a systemic cost as elimination will
necessarily entail undesirable consequences—as each of the two forms exists to
combat particular undesirable consequences. Deciding which of the two policies will

61 Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). Though it is arguably not needed, expert testimony may still be
provided to persuade the judge to exercise discretion in favor of one party or the other.
62 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (discussing the principal that every instance
of applying facts to a statute requires interpreting the text of the statute). As the current doctrinal
layout was created by the courts interpreting § 248, it is clearly within their power to reverse or
change course. In the alternative, Congress could of course resolve the issue through legislation. It
is a cleaner fix for the court to handle this mess itself, because whatever fix Congress provides may
lead to the same result as the present case due to the underlying issue having been caused by
differing interpretations and applications of the statute in the first place.
63 Id. Doing so is explicitly necessary. In the case of the “lost profits” royalty surviving, it can
be argued that cases such as Lucent implicitly abrogate the Denison Royalty by having established
precedent inconsistent with the Denison Royalty policy objectives and concerns. If the Denison
Royalty is to survive, then the existing inconsistencies posed by cases, such as Lucent, need to be
overturned in order to harmonize the doctrine and eliminate its compensatory analysis.
64 Id.
Since the ultimate matter is one of determining how to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 284’s
“minimum” award, the remaining theory will constitute the amount which an award shall not be
below.
65 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 35, at 1993.
This policy limiting or eliminating the
potential harm of royalty stacking, or other negative consequences inherent in systemic
overcompensation.
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win in all cases forces upon the public the harms the losing variation intended to
alleviate.66
Additionally, in considering which policy objective to favor, the court may not be
entirely free to pick from the two options and will be forced to decide the matter by
fighting over the meaning and definition of the statute, rather than on the policy
merits of the doctrines.67
B. Blended
In order for the system to alleviate both Denison sufficient compensation and
“lost profits” overcompensation concerns, the court might try and combine the two
doctrines into a single reasonable royalty analysis. At first blush, however, it is
unlikely the two doctrines can truly be reconciled. 68
On one hand, “lost profits” royalty analysis truly focuses on the factual question
of reasonability and the policy concern of ensuring the infringer is not paying more
than is rightly owed to restore the patentee. 69 On the other, Denison Royalty
analysis forgoes any concern for the defendant, eschewing a factual evidentiary basis
in favor of court discretion and experience to achieve the desired outcome. In order
to give any effect to the Denison framework, it would be absolutely necessary to keep
the question away from the jury, because the jury is only ever a trier of fact and the
evidence-lacking Denison framework will never be appropriate for the jury. It should
be accurate to say the Denison framework can only truly come into play when the
evidence is insufficient, inconclusive, and there is no way for a jury to award any
amount of damages, aside from speculation. At this point, it is the duty of the judge
to exercise his or her discretion in determining what the appropriate award is given
the facts that are available. The two theories require different presumptions on the

66 Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 107 (2012) (relevant here is the implication of the risks faced by excluding entire categories).
Intuitively, if there are competing policy objectives, then by stating one policy wins over the other in
all cases will result in the harms of the eliminated doctrine having little or no means of alleviation.
67 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). To the extent that the legislature has spoken on the subject, the
courts are relegated to merely interpreting and applying the statute. The gap filling power of the
court might allow them to decide that one or the other doctrinal variation will be eliminated. But
the court’s hands are tied, even when picking between them, to the extent that the court is obligated
to give effect to the statute even if they disagree with the policy or outcomes. Despite the court’s
justified concern for overcompensation in recent years, the structure of the statute and history of the
term “reasonable royalty,” as used in the patent context when codified, would lean heavily toward
the Denison framework.
68 Compare U.S. Frumentum, 216 F. at 616-618, with Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1327 (these cases
exemplify many of the arguments and underpinnings which are inherent in the two competing
theories). If the two doctrines cannot be merged in a coherent fashion, then it is not only likely that
attempting to merge them will not resolve the existing problems, but that new issues and confusion
will emerge in the process of trying to do so.
69 See Lucent, 580 F. 3d at 1325. In this context, the hypothetical negotiation becomes a tool for
the jury to assess and weigh the facts of the case to create a logical chain which results in both the
amount and form of the royalty. Since lump-sum and running royalties entail different distributions
of risk between the parties, it will thus be necessary for the jury to not only consider the amount of
the award, but also the form of the award.
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amount of evidence. It is therefore difficult to see how a court would manage
blending the two in any coherent fashion.
C. Segregating the theories
Eliminating one of the alternatives leaves only one of the two policy objectives
fulfilled, and blending the two appears to lead to instability. Splitting the two
theories into separate analyses seems to allow retention of most of the benefits and
eliminates most of the flaws. If this is possible, there can be a principled manner to
distinguish between the two forms of reasonable royalty and keep them doctrinally
separate. To find these differences it is necessary to: (1) categorize them; (2) define
the scope each should have; (3) identify which parts of the existing reasonable royalty
analysis belong in each of the two groups; (4) identify under what circumstances each
should be applied to remain consistent with their policy objectives; and (5) identify
what the resulting legal requirements of proof should be for each.
1. “Lost Profits” royalty
The “lost profits” royalty essentially amounts to an acknowledgement of the
following syllogism: minor premise, a royalty which is in-fact reasonable is more
likely than not an amount which would be accepted by a market participant and
therefore earned by the patentee in absence of infringement; major premise, any
amount the patentee would have earned in-fact, but which was not earned due to the
infringement is compensable under § 284; conclusion, a royalty amount which is
in-fact reasonable is compensable under § 284.70
This theory relies on factual assertions—the royalty is reasonable—and it
should only be used in cases where the plaintiff is arguing that the defendant would
have accepted the proffered royalty amount. Since the plaintiff is trying to prove the
factual assertion as to the royalty’s reasonability, the burden is wholly upon them to
proffer sufficient evidence to meet the preponderance standard, as well as show that
the form of payment desired (running or lump-sum) would have been accepted at the
rate/amount argued. These scenarios are where Lucent, ResQNet, and Wordtech
have their greatest force. These cases illuminate the need for substantial evidence
for both the type and amount of the royalty to be compensated and the requirement
70 Cf. Yale Lock Mfg., 117 U.S. at 552. The basis for allowing a price reduction analysis is just
as relevant for royalties. If a patentee were to go onto the market and collect royalties on his patent,
these would be a profit to him. By infringing the patent, the infringer denies the patentee this
particular form of profit. By its nature, a “reasonable” royalty must be one which those in the
market would be expected to pay. Thus, once it is established that a given royalty amount is
reasonable, it is conclusive that a “willing participant” would have paid it. By definition, a royalty,
under the Georgia-Pacific hypothetical analysis, is reasonable only if under the circumstances both
parties would have agreed to the license terms in form and amount. If the price is unreasonable it
will not be bought, but the license will be purchased so long as the price is reasonable.
Georgia-Pacific is particularly illustrative in determining this issue. All of the factors in the test go
toward proving up the price the patentee would demand or require to license its product—charging a
premium when licensing to a direct competitor—or determining how much a licensee would
reasonably be willing to pay—existing royalties showing what licensees pay.
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that the evidence presented be similar enough to the case at hand to allow a jury to
reasonably reach the concluded amount. In these cases, the proper appellate review
would be that typical for other damages cases. In particular, that means reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence relative to the result the jury reached. The policies
furthered here are § 284 compensation—normally governed by lost profits—and the
desire to prevent overcompensation of plaintiffs.
2. Denison Royalty
The Denison Royalty is premised on the notion that even in cases where
evidence is wanting or insufficient, it is still in the public interest to award a sum
commensurate with both the circumstances and the policy of ensuring patents
remain a valuable enough incentive to spur innovation.71 For this reason, when a
jury cannot find compensable damages for want of sufficient evidence, the court itself
must assess an award to grant the plaintiff. The decision of how much to award
must be an exercise of the court’s discretion. This comports with § 284’s specific
allowance of expert testimony for this purpose, which gives the parties the ability to
assist the court in exercising this very narrow form of discretion. 72 Given the method
of determination, as well as the policy behind the Denison Royalty, the proper
standard for reviewing the decision of the judge should be one of abuse of discretion. 73
This Denison Royalty should act as a ‘residual’ recovery—only applicable when other
forms of recovery prove unavailable or insufficient. This should be viewed as the
form of recovery which § 284 states the award shall not “be less than.”74
With the lines of the split doctrines in place, it becomes apparent that
Georgia-Pacific’s fifteen factors play a useful role in both: each factor points to a
specific fact which, if proven, provides grounds upon which a jury could inform its
decision when determining a lost-profits royalty.75 Further, these same factors
provide a helpful list of economic and factual considerations for judges exercising
their discretion to determine a Denison Royalty, giving both guidance to district

71 See U.S. Frumentum, 216 F. at 616-618. It is not expressly addressed whether cases entirely
lacking in damages evidence can obtain an award. But as a policy matter this would actually be
consistent with the purposes of the doctrine. If one considers what would hypothetically happen, the
need for awards, even without evidence becomes clear: in a world where a successful patent owner in
an infringement action cannot obtain damages, or only nominal damages, the patent-right would be
diminished in worth for many inventors. Inventors may stop seeking out patents, resulting in
slower technological progress due to such inventors not disclosing their methods for others to build
upon. In the case of patent trolls, or other non-practicing entities, who still wish to enforce their
rights, the Denison Royalty is the mechanism they ought to be forced to use.
72 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (stating that the court may hear expert testimony when making its
determination).
73 Id. See also U.S. Frumentum, 216 F. at 616-618.
This renders decisions like Lucent
fundamentally immaterial to Denison Royalty analysis, because it can be readily presumed that
“substantial evidence” will not have been presented—the entire theory is built to enter into the
equation only when this is so (or in the rare case where the amounts a jury did find compensable
were below even the amount a court would have awarded via its discretion).
74 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
75 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120; see supra note 22.
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courts for the initial calculation and guidance to appellate courts when reviewing
whether the calculation by the district court was an abuse of discretion.
V. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence surrounding patent “reasonable royalty” has resulted in both
policy and result uncertainty due to the term being used in two distinct, but correct,
manners without explicitly stating the different uses. While the court has multiple
choices available to resolve the issue, the best choice is to segregate the two doctrines
and force litigants to specify which theory they are arguing. Rather than eliminating
one theory, or attempting to blend them both, separating the two pushes the policy
concerns of each form of the doctrine in the desired direction. Additionally, this
choice allows both full recovery and the opportunity for a jury to assess the facts
under a compensation theory. This step also allows the court to retain residual
recovery under the court’s discretion to further patent policy objectives. This division
gives a more full effect to § 284 than removing either theory, and enables more
streamlined and consistent application of the law than the blended approach.
Finally, the segregated approach shifts much of the burden policy concerns and likely
extent of recovery to the litigants rather than the court. Any balancing of
contradictory policy objectives will inevitably have its hiccups. It may not truly be
possible to obtain the ‘best’ of both worlds. But dividing these theories of recovery
allows them both to grow and promote the good each theory has the potential to
achieve.

